By 1993 each state had at least a modest inventory of
tanks and other armored equipment, air defense missiles,
combat aircraft, armed helicopters, and missile-armed
naval craft with which to deter an intruder. Kuwait
is less prepared than the others, not having recovered
from the losses it suffered in personnel and equipment
during the Persian Gulf War. A fundamental constraint
for all the gulf states has been the limited pool of
qualified manpower and, in most countries, the problem
of attracting recruits when better employment opportunities
exist in the civilian sector. The emphasis on advanced
weaponry is part of an effort to minimize the need for
personnel. As stated by a senior Kuwaiti officer, the
object is to obtain the best equipment technologically,
"easy to maintain, understand, and operate . .
. the greatest firepower for the smallest human effort."
But integrating modern weapons into the gulf armies
and ensuring their effective operation create other
problems. Such problems include the necessity of continued
reliance on foreign officers and foreign maintenance
and training staffs at a time when all gulf states are
trying to achieve greater self-sufficiency. Dependence
on foreign personnel, moreover, implies a degree of
loyalty and trustworthiness that may not be forthcoming
in times of crisis.
Although in every case the gulf armies are much larger
than the air forces and navies, the ground forces have
traditionally been oriented toward counterinsurgency
actions and the protection of the ruling families. Most
of the armies are organized into one or more combat
brigades; actual fighting strengths are generally lower
than the brigade structure implies. Except for the officers
and men who were briefly exposed to modern military
operations during the Persian Gulf War--and in the late
1960s and first half of the 1970s during Oman's war
with Dhofari guerrillas and their supporters in the
PDRY--most have not faced actual combat situations.
In recognition of the great strategic importance of
their air and sea defenses, the gulf states have all
introduced modern combat aircraft and air defense missile
systems, such as the United States Hawk surface-to-air
missile (SAM). Several of the states have in their inventories
or on order attack helicopters to help protect their
oil facilities and oil drilling platforms in the gulf.
All the gulf states have communications, control, and
warning systems for the effective use of their fighter
aircraft and antiaircraft missiles. But each air force
is small, and, unless integrated with others, the overall
effectiveness of the GCC in air defense is marginal.
In spite of the attention the problem has received,
there is no common network linking all air defense squadrons
and SAMs to the Saudi Arabian air defense system and
to the Saudi airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft. Technical difficulties, including the incompatibility
of national communications systems and the reluctance
to turn control of national air defense over to a unified
command structure, account for this weakness.
Fast-missile attack craft acquired by all of the gulf
navies with small but well-trained crews could inflict
damaging blows to heavier fleets and discourage hostile
amphibious operations. The sixty-two-meter corvettes
belonging to Bahrain and the UAE are the largest vessels
among the gulf navies. As the tanker war demonstrated,
the navies lack minesweeping capability, and their shipboard
defense weapons against air attack are also weak. Only
Oman has available larger amphibious transports to convey
troops and vehicles for defending islands or remote
coastal areas.
Defense expenditures of the gulf states are among the
highest in the world relative to population. According
to an analysis covering 1989, prepared by the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Qatar recorded
the highest per capita military expenditures of any
country in the world, followed by Israel and the United
States. Oman ranked fourth and Kuwait sixth. The UAE
was eleventh highest; Bahrain, listed in twentyseventh
place worldwide, had the lowest outlays relatively of
the gulf states. Military spending as a percentage of
central government expenditures also is high, amounting
to more than 40 percent in Oman and the UAE, for example.
In contrast, military spending in Bahrain is 13 percent
of central government expenditure. Military expenditures
as a percentage of the gross national product are more
moderate except for Oman, whose military outlays were
more than 20 percent of GNP in 1989. Force ratios are
also high in Oman and the UAE; both countries had about
twenty men in uniform per 1,000 population in 1989.
Their respective rankings were eleventh and twelfth
highest in the world. Bahrain and Kuwait had manpower
levels of about ten per 1,000 population, whereas the
level for Qatar was fifteen per 1,000 in 1989.
In spite of the small personnel pools and the desire
of all the gulf governments to train nationals to replace
foreigners as quickly as possible, constraints found
in traditional Islamic societies prevent the widespread
recruitment of women to serve in the armed forces. Oman
and Bahrain have allowed a few women to enlist. They
receive combat-style training and learn how to operate
small arms. In Bahrain, however, almost all the women
have been assigned to hospital staffs. In 1990 the UAE
introduced a five-month training course for female recruits
with the assistance of a team of female soldiers from
the United States. About 1,200 women applied; only seventy-four
were accepted. Two top members of the first class were
selected to continue with officer training at the Royal
Military Academy at Sandhurst, in Britain. The other
graduates of the first class were assigned as bodyguards
of female members of the ruling families and as specialists
in such fields as military intelligence.
Before the Persian Gulf War, some women served in support
departments of the Kuwaiti armed forces, including engineering,
military establishments, moral guidance, and public
relations. In July 1991, noting that a large number
of women had volunteered for service in the postwar
military, the minister of defense said that some would
be accepted for a training period of three to six months
but would initially be unsalaried. A role would then
be found for them. The minister cautioned that acceptance
by Kuwaiti society was essential for the government
to move ahead with this plan. |
